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Abstract: Central to the discourse on the intentional structure of 
consciousness encompasses further forms of experience, for 
instance, the notion of one’s direct experience of others. In 
essence, one’s experience of others is materialized through 
intersubjective engagement which is fundamental in 
comprehending the relation of the Self and Other. Intersubjective 
engagement between the two cognizing subjects is evidently 
interactive negotiation of understanding, thus necessarily 
meditational. This paper will substantiate the meditational or 
reflective nature of intersubjective engagement with the 
phenomenology of self-projection, giving emphasis on the 
experience of the Self in relation to Others. The activity of self-
projection onto others which is argued to take place through 
introspection, incorporates modes such as representation, 
simulation, imitation, empathic interaction and self-attribution. 
Furthermore, this paper will conclude intersubjectivity as an 
advent of joint construction of meaning and representation 
between the two cognizing subjects, thus, the collaborative 
endeavor of shared construction of meaning and representation is 
attained throughout the process. 
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The nature of consciousness is probably the most taxing matter to 
comprehend central to the progressing discussion of the human mind. 
Questions relevant to the features and characterization of consciousness 
compelled philosophers and the intellectuals in the field of neuroscience to 
develop philosophical theories and analysis, and computational and 
psychological models, with an aim to provide a concrete and objective 
explanation on the subject. Although there has not been a universal and 
final account on the said notion, differences in the approach of 
philosophers and intellectuals provide an extensive illumination in 
determining the nature and characteristics of consciousness. 
Part of the discourse about consciousness is the percipience that it 
means something about higher order thought, or access, or monitoring, or 
self-reflection1 and it is something that we all have available to us on the 
basis of our experience2. That is, the idea of consciousness rests primarily 
on the cognitive phenomenon of a cognizing subject which presents the 
sense of thinking and reasoning. It connotes multiple things, from a 
particular alert or awake state of the mind3, to its state of acquiring 
objectivity on information, representations, memories, as well as the sense 
of one’s social nature of all we know of knowing.4 In this sense, albeit the 
focus on cognitive process on the account of consciousness, it now 
furthered to social and affective phenomenon, as the social nature of 
knowledge is manifested through one’s common or shared knowledge with 
others who are also bearers of knowledge. Although this take on 
consciousness has changed since René Descartes construed it to be 
individualistic, private, independent of the collective, thus, accessible to 
itself through self-reflection, taken into account in his cogito ergo sum.5 
Furthermore: 
 
1 Susan Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness (Oxford: New York, 2005), 24. 
2 Ibid., 27. 
3 Philippe Rochat, Others in Mind: Social Origins of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge 
University Press: United Kingdom, 2009), 50. 
4 Ibid., 51. 
5 Ibid., 50. 
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The crucial point and what gives the specificity of consciousness 
is that it is the result of a process that depends primarily on the 
individual’s self-reflection and thinking. It acknowledges the fact 
that there is a state of mind where we can think primarily for 
ourselves, making discoveries on our own and seemingly for 
ourselves …6 
 
As consciousness is by nature a first-person perspective, its 
dependence on self-reflection confers to one’s subjective experience. 
Subjective experience incorporates ‘self-awareness’ through the act of 
introspection, in which the act itself leads to understanding other minds 
relative to the Self; and this understanding of others has to do with how the 
self experiences the other’s behavior through his/her own interpretative 
lens.7 In this sense, self-awareness arises from interactive experiences,8 
inherently relational in approach, conducting collaborative process,9 on the 
basis of self-understanding—thus participating in an intersubjective 
engagement. As intersubjective engagement is chiefly the active and 
interactive negotiation of understanding between cognizing subject, this 
communicative competence between them demonstrates social, cognitive, 
and affective phenomenon. Hence, intersubjective engagement is attained 
with the advent of one’s distinction of the Self in relation to Others, which 
is occurs through the act of introspection, thus embodying the act of self-
projection. Self-projection, on the latter part of the discussion, is 
deliberated as a value of intersubjectivity. 
 
6 Rochat, Others in Mind, 52. 
7 R.D. Laing, H. Phillipson, and A.R. Lee, Interpersonal Perception: A Theory and a 
Method of Research (London: Tavistock, 1996), 131. 
8 Jeremy I.M. Carpendale and Charlie Lewis, “Reaching, requesting and reflecting: 
From interpersonal engagement to thinking,” in Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion 
and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness and Language, ed. Ad Foolen, et al. 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.), 244. 
9 Susan R. Fussell, et. al., “Visual Cues as Evidence of Other’s Minds in Collaborative 
Physical Tasks,” in Other Minds: How Human Bridge the Divide between Self and Others, 
ed. Bertram F. Malle  and Sara D. Hodges (New York: The Guildford Press, 2005), 91-92. 
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ON THE ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The account of ‘consciousness’ oftentimes situated similar to the 
terminology ‘awareness,’ as both may imply the idea that if one is 
conscious, one is aware of things. In this sense, consciousness is simplified 
as the awareness of things directly perceived or observed, displaying no 
confusion between the meaning of the two, for both terms are considered 
synonymous as ordinary language denote. Typically, when one utters “I am 
aware that the floor is slippery,” we understand it as similar to the utterance 
“I am conscious of the fact that the floor is slippery” whether by learning 
that the floor is slippery by a signage or noticing that the floor is wet, or by 
realizing it through stepping on the floor and almost slipping. The words 
‘conscious’ and ‘aware’ denote the knowledge of the person that the floor is 
wet, therefore impelling the person to take extra precaution when walking 
on the wet floor. The manner of usage of the two words displays the 
function of ordinary language in making one’s knowledge or understanding 
clear and easy to express and comprehend. However, Daniel Dennett 
argued that these concepts have significant difference asserting the 
Intentional and non-Intentional uses of these: 
 
On the Intentional side, we speak of being conscious of this or that, 
aware of this or that, aware that such and such is the case, and—
less naturally—conscious that such and such is the case. On the 
non-Intentional side, we speak of being just plain conscious or 
unconscious, and of being a conscious form of life, and, in rather 
artificial speech, of someone’s simply being aware, in the sense of 
being ‘on the qui vive’ or sensitive to the current situation. We also 
speak of conscious and unconscious motives or desires, but these 
can be assimilated under the Intentional idioms, as motives and 
desires we are conscious of.10 
 
 
10 Daniel C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge, 1969), 114-115. 
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This categorization brings clarity on the proper sense of which we 
are to use the words ‘conscious’ and ‘aware’—the latter speaks of being 
aware of or conscious of a particular object or a thing, implying 
intentionality, thus categorized as Intentional, and the former speaks of 
distinction from sub-consciousness or unconsciousness, simply a fancy 
way of stating alertness, thus non-Intentional. Thus, when one say “I am 
aware that the floor is slippery,” the person is implying the acquired 
knowledge that the floor is slippery and the awareness’ intentionality is on 
the floor being wet. On the contrary, the non-Intentional use of the word 
‘conscious’ will be applicable in such instance that one is attentive of the 
surroundings, that when it feels like the floor is slippery as s/he walks on 
it, s/he will certainly realize it. Another, in the instance that you are 
supposed to meet with your male friend in a coffee shop at a particular time, 
you are inclined to look for him on the basis of his physical features to 
distinguish him from the crowd. You will look for someone who is tall, 
brown skinned, pointed nose and full-bearded man who might be sitting in 
one corner sipping his espresso while waiting for you. Your full awareness 
is directed to this physical appearance while you search through the crowd, 
ignoring those who do not fit with physical feature you have in your mind. 
Others are simply objects or individuals who fill up the space of the coffee 
shop, giving you the experience of a busy coffee shop. You are simply 
‘conscious’ or attentive enough that the coffee shop has a lot of customers 
enjoying their drinks while having conversation, but you are ‘aware’ that 
there is your friend with certain physical features sitting in one corner 
waiting for you. Your awareness of the presence of your friend displays your 
Intentionality to a certain person with certain features, thus being ‘aware,’ 
while you simply know the existence of other people in the coffee shop in a 
non-Intentional way, thus being ‘conscious.’ Generally, this distinction 
between the terms awareness and consciousness, indicating that of 
Dennett’s Intentional and non-Intentional usage, provided not only the 
proper usage of each term relevant to its meaning but also providing proper 
usage in context. Significantly, this will sustain the perspective or situation 
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being expressed without confusion or misplaced synonymity fashioned by 
the ordinary language. 
On the other hand, the nature of awareness could be situated into 
two aspects: one is awareness of things for maneuvering in the 
environment, and the second is the ability of introspection reports.11 The 
former aspect infers to awareness and its link to a certain setting, governing 
one’s behavior, while the latter aspect infers to one’s description of own 
experience of a certain thing. Both aspects provide a different involvement 
as one is into the occurrence of things around while the other is into the 
introspection of private and covert experience. In the aforementioned 
example of awareness of the floor being slippery, it is anticipated that the 
person who is aware that the floor is slippery, there will be a significant 
change in his/her behavior, from being clumsy to being cautious for 
him/her not to slip while walking on the slippery floor. This illustrates the 
aspect of awareness that induces maneuver in the environment. Control in 
one’s behavior is displayed to act accordingly to the context or setting 
where one is situated, thus manifesting proper actions or response 
applicable to certain circumstances. In the instance that you are crossing 
the main road intersection, your awareness constraints you from being 
careless to being mindful and alert of the vehicles driving fast, that when 
you are already in the middle of the pedestrian lane and there is this 
reckless motorcycle driver swiftly passed by, you can take a quick step back 
or move away hastily, preventing yourself from being hit. Your senses will 
warn you of the danger as your awareness of the surroundings is 
heightened. In this manner, your awareness is involved with the events 
around you and most probably, the sense of Intentionality of awareness is 
towards vehicles and the whole crossing space. This feature of 
consciousness is certainly perceivable in humans as humans are involved 
in their environment and response is exhibited as part of his/her 
contingency to it. However, this might be questionable with the 
 
11 Dennett, Content and Consciousness, 115-116. 
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consciousness of animals, since animals are also contingent to their 
environment and they respond to the occurrences of things that surround 
them. If in the same instance, crossing the main road intersection, the cat 
crosses in the pedestrian lane and suddenly a motorcycle swiftly passed by, 
the cat can save itself from being hit. The cat’s reaction to the sudden event 
will exhibit not only its agility but as well as its awareness of what is 
happening around it, thus manifesting Intentionality. Though cat’s 
awareness in an Intentional manner still poses questions on the extent of 
its involvement to the environment, on the similarity of the experience of 
awareness that humans have with what the cat has or animals have in 
general, and the cat’s or animals’ perception of the objects conceived in 
relation to them. No particular account asserts the certainty nor 
uncertainty that animal consciousness is analogous to that of the humans, 
even on the observed overt and controlled behavior of animals, unless 
animals themselves happen to tell us, directly expressing the distinct 
experience for our comprehension of their minds. This means of ascribing 
one’s immediate experience is probable in the second aspect of 
consciousness that is yet to be mentioned, the ability of introspective 
reports. Dennett puts it: 
 
The reason we feel safe in ascribing awareness of things as certain 
things to people is that they tell us. We do not know what it is like 
to be a bee or a bird, but we know what it is like to be blind or 
myopic or to have tunnel vision, because people suffering from 
these conditions can describe their experiences. The human 
capacity for making introspective reports is seen as a mode of 
access to the content of awareness, and in virtue of the 
invulnerability to error… its deliverances are seen as reliable—
indeed conclusive—evidence of the content of awareness.12 
 
 
12 Dennett, Content and Consciousness, 116. 
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In introspection reports, the content of awareness can be 
specifically quantified relevant to what is ascribed by the person who has 
the experience, and in this manner, what is affirmed by the person will be 
apprehended truthfully, as the experience itself is private and could 
oftentimes not be subject to observance. As the content of awareness is 
oftentimes covert, one’s direct access to other’s experience is through the 
articulation of it, regardless of the behavior exhibited being or not being 
aligned to what is articulated. One might argue that introspective reports 
could still pose question on the authenticity of the articulated experience 
as one can be subject to faults in describing the events and recollections. 
On the contrary, relying solely on the observed behavior could also pose 
questions in the instance that it is possible to ascribe one’s behavior simply 
by the subjective understanding of others. Both might have its own 
limitations, but this could be resolved if both features are considered and 
used in the process of understanding consciousness. 
Introspective reports exhibit subjective dispositions as private 
experiences are what is articulated. If you and your friend were asked “How 
much pain are you feeling” after being in an accident while crossing the 
intersection, you will certainly have a different answer with your friend, 
depending on how much impact you got, what body part you got hit, or how 
much pain your body can tolerate. While being asked, you will tend to be 
fully aware of the pain you are feeling to be able to comprehend the 
sensation of pain you are experiencing. Your mind is retrieving the 
sensation from your body to fathom the feeling of being in pain. Or 
probably, you feel the sensation of pain you are experiencing to fathom the 
sensation of pain that your friend is experiencing, trying to place yourself 
in the experience of others by understanding the same occurrence you have 
experienced formerly. Bernard Baars remarked that questions about 
consciousness in the account of subject activity such as “’what is it like to 
be you or me?’ —you get into the classic mind-body paradoxes where you 
end up with the three classical positions in the mind-body problem: 
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mentalism, physicalism, and dualism.13 David Chalmers explicated the 
mind-body problem as a subject matter that: 
 
… covers a multitude of sins. One is this question: ‘How is it that 
the brain can support subjective experiences?’ Another one is: 
‘How can the brain support thought, or rationality and 
intelligence?’ Maybe that is not quite the same problem, because 
it’s closer to the domain of behaviour. Another question is: ‘How 
can the mind affect the physical world?’ That’s very closely related. 
But they are slightly different problems. We can think of the hard 
problem as the real core of the mind-body problem.14 
 
Chalmers have identified easy problems and hard problems as 
categories of the approach in mind-body problem, remarking that the 
former focuses more on the relevance of consciousness in the physical 
world, that is, the mechanisms of the environment affecting consciousness 
as well as the processes of systems built in the materiality of the brain, while 
the latter poses questions relevant to the subjective experience of the 
person. Chalmers posit easy problems in consciousness as that which 
‘explain the various behaviors and functions associated with 
consciousness…explain how it is that my eye distinguishes and separates 
different sensory stimuli, how my brain integrates that information, how 
that leads to certain kinds of verbal reports and responses on my part’,15 
whereas the hard problems are questions asserting and explaining how all 
these mechanisms, functions, and behaviors operate in the subjective 
experience of a person. Bernard Baars placed the association of 
consciousness, its content and emergence, with the workings of the brain, 
which displays the physicalist approach in the mind-body problem, 
categorized as the easy problem: 
 
 
13 Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness, 12. 
14 Ibid., 41-42. 
15 Ibid., 48. 
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There is a pathway from the eyes to the visual cortex. Below the 
cortex the pathway does not seem to involve consciousness. The 
visual cortex, in a very simplified way, can be thought of as a 
staircase: at the beginning of the staircase you have a map of your 
visual field with just very simple pixels, black and white dots; a 
little bit further on you have lines, and contrast edges between 
white lines and black lines; a little bit further on you have motion 
representation; and further on you have colour, and so on. At 
every step you add a little bit more analysis of the information that 
flows into your eyes. When you follow the staircase from visual 
region to region you finally come to object recognition cells in the 
bottom half of the temporal cortex, the cortex that is close to the 
temples of the head; and as you come to the end of the lower 
temporal cortex you finally come to the top of the staircase where 
you have object representation. And the best evidence that we 
have today—which comes from a dozen years of single-cell studies 
of all these different steps on the staircase—is that things become 
conscious on the top of the staircase, where you have cells that 
represent objects. Now that is over-simplified, but it’s not a bad 
quick summary!16 
 
Baars explained in simple details the corresponding regions of the 
brain that is responsible in making object representation upon perceiving 
an object. From the sensory input originating from the eyes, travels through 
the visual cortex of the brain, retrieving the form, color, outline, and/or 
movement of the perceived object, and in the latter part, being conscious of 
what is being perceived—the brain develops what will be the eventual 
content of consciousness, either Intentional or non-Intentional use. 
Formation of mental images or thoughts or the activity of recollecting 
memories are bound to the systematic mechanisms of the brain, thus, the 
content of the awareness is formed by the workings of the brain. The 
primary function of the nervous system, as far as we know, is to encode 
 
16 Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness, 13. 
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knowledge, to know things; and the technical term that’s often used for this 
is representation,17 however, this explication on the emergence of 
consciousness seems lacking for this only concentrates on the physicalist 
mechanisms of the brain. For Chalmers: 
 
… subjective experience can’t be reduced to a brain process. No 
explanation solely in terms of brain processes will be such that we 
can deduce the existence of consciousness from it. I think 
someone could know all the physical facts about the world and still 
not know about consciousness.18 
 
Ned Block seems to have the same sentiment as that of Chalmers as 
he asserts that the physiology of the human brain is what will determine 
one’s phenomenology, thus, not neglecting the significance of subjective 
experience. For Block, consciousness is something about higher-order 
thought, or access, or monitoring, or self-reflection19 coining it as 
phenomenal consciousness. This ascription to consciousness pertains to 
self-consciousness where one has the capacity to access his/her own way of 
thinking, monitor his/her behavior and responses, and has the ability to 
contemplate on these. This access to one’s own consciousness and 
behavioral responses procures knowledge of one’s self which shapes one’s 
own subjective experience. Self-knowledge parallels to awareness of one’s 
own sensations, thoughts, and feelings—what is inside of you—and is only 
attainable through contemplation or self-reflection, that is, accessing your 
own consciousness in a third person perspective. For an instance, you are 
a novice in mountain climbing, no experience at all, but recognized your 
enthusiasm and consider yourself brave that despite the dangers you might 
encounter, you still decided to join a group of experienced mountain 
climbers to conquer the trail. However, you realized how frightened you 
 
17 Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness, 12. 
18 Ibid., 42. 
19 Ibid., 24. 
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were when you were already in the middle of the trail, seeing how high you 
have already climbed, then decided not to continue and instead climb down 
the mountain. You might ask yourself “Am I brave enough to climb the 
mountain despite me failing eventually?” or “Is me being enthusiastic equal 
to me being brave?” or “Is it right for me to back down when I realized that 
I am frightened? What if I continued so? Will I be able to develop real 
bravery?” You might also arrive to realizations such as “I thought I am 
brave, but I realized I am actually not” or “At least I have already 
experienced it. The next time I will do it, I will be ready enough that I will 
no longer feel frightened anymore!” These questions exhibit one’s self-
knowledge. The novice knows him/herself as a person who is enthusiastic 
to try out new things, brave enough to surpass even the dangers of 
mountain climbing, and self-willed to decide to do it. These questions also 
exhibit self-reflection, that the novice tried to comprehend or access 
his/her feelings of frightfulness, his/her thoughts asking him/herself what 
if she did not back out, his/her behavior and responses during the time that 
s/he was terrified, and the understanding of what it truly feels when s/he 
is terrified of something. All these questions lead the novice to fully 
comprehend self-awareness—internalizing what it feels like to be 
him/herself, what is it like to have this experience—that is, incorporating 
him/herself within his/her own subjective experience. This subjective 
experience, as what has already been mentioned, is a private account, and 
the probability of accessing this private account of experience is by asking 
the kind of question Ned Block asked, “what is it like to be you or me?” For 
one to be able to understand the subjective experience of that novice, one 
has to rely not only on the novice’s introspective reports, but also putting 
him/herself in the position of the novice, and that is the manner of 
projecting one’s self-attributes onto others.20 The next section of this paper 
will attempt to explicate the manner of accessing other’s consciousness 
 
20 Jean Decety, “Perspective Taking as the Royal Avenue to Empathy, ” in Other Minds: 
How Human Bridge the Divide between Self and Others, ed. Bertram F. Malle  and Sara D. 
Hodges (New York: The Guildford Press, 2005), 143-157. 
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through self-projection, emphasizing its significance in relating to one’s self 
and to others. 
 
SELF-PROJECTION: THE EXPERIENCE 
OF OTHERS’ CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The question “what is it like to be you or me” posits a complex 
understanding of consciousness, for it seeks to understand involvement of 
one’s self in the experience of his/her own being and in the experience of 
others. Its complexity is not limited to the systematic mechanism of the 
brain processes, but encompasses subjective experience that is quite not 
absolutely explainable in terms of the objective processes in science. If 
subjective experience is posited, one can instead rely on the 
phenomenalistic encounter of a person that is only accessible by others 
through articulation. Self-knowledge plays a significant locus in accessing 
one’s consciousness as this serves as the grounds on how you are to see and 
comprehend other’s behaviors and thoughts, as remarked by Jean Decety: 
 
… one’s own perspective is the default mode (and the prepotent 
one) by which we relate to others. We see others as similar to 
ourselves on a variety of dimensions and consequently assume 
that they act as we act, know what we know, and feel what we feel. 
This default mode is based on a shared representation mechanism 
between self and other.21 
 
Our perspective on others has its reference to our knowledge of 
ourselves for we understand others on the basis of how we know ourselves, 
and this manner is what was mentioned as shared representations, that is, 
our thought processes, responses, sense-perceptions and such are parallel 
to that of others. Moreover, since the consciousness that is most accessible 
to us is our own, what we do by default is to look internally and associate 
 
21 Decety, “Perspective Taking as the Royal Avenue to Empathy, ” 143. 
C. Coles  131 
 
© 2021 Philosophical Association of the Philippines 
https://suri.pap73.org/issue14/coles_suri_october2021.pdf 
our own attributes to others, thus, making our own perception and action 
as the primary base of our understanding of others. In the aforementioned 
instance of mountain climbing, you would be able to empathize with the 
novice’s disappointment of not fulfilling the goal s/he has set for 
him/herself, by situating yourself in the position of being a novice and 
trying to feel the same feeling the novice had felt—frightened. You tend to 
look at the possibilities that triggered the fright, probably the extremity of 
the trail or lack of preparation or mistaken bravery, and the like, and will 
ask yourself  “If I am in the same situation, will I respond the same? Or 
different? Will I be frightened enough or not? Will I back out in case I 
became frightened? Or will I bravely continue the trail?” You will certainly 
have an answer to this but on the basis of how much you know yourself, not 
on how much you believe the novice is capable of doing so. As you measure 
your own capability to finish the trail without being frightened, you might 
exclaim “You should have been brave enough to continue the trail!” 
This tendency of affirming ourselves in the disposition of others and 
being biased toward the self-perspective is a general condition of human 
cognition.22 This most likely to happen if you have an experience similar 
with the other person, that you have encountered the same instance and 
surpassed it, and you have a strong belief that if an ordinary person like you 
can overcome something, others would definitely as well. Recollection can 
immediately take place and as we are bound to refer ourselves on to these, 
we project our own attributions to others. Furthermore, Decety asserted 
that: 
 
While the projection of self-attributes onto the other does not 
necessitate any significant store of knowledge about the other, 
empathic understanding requires the inclusion of other 
characteristics within the self.23 
 
 
22 Decety, “Perspective Taking as the Royal Avenue to Empathy, ” 146. 
23 Ibid., 144. 
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This self-attribution to others only requires self-knowledge as we 
deemed reflect about different occurrences around us on the basis of the 
extent of our awareness and understanding of ourselves. The empathic 
understanding that compels one to be involved in other’s disposition is 
displayed as the perceiver or the observer pretends to be in a certain state 
where the perceived or observed person is in. One might or might not 
realize that s/he is in the act of empathic understanding when tend to ask, 
“What would I be thinking if I were him/her?,” What would I be doing if I 
am in his/her situation?,” but these very questions infer to the belief or 
feelings of others by situating one’s self with self-reflection. This act is what 
Glenn Reeder asserted as simulation: 
 
… that perceivers mentally place themselves in the other person’s 
shoes, attempting to simulate what the target thinks… imagining 
the perceptual input the other person experiences (what the other 
sees, hears, and touches). The perceiver then tries to experience 
(or match) the same thoughts and emotions that exist in the 
target. The results of this simulation are then attributed to the 
target.24 
 
As expounded, this simulation refers to the overall process of 
perceiving things in the perspective of the person in target. Recognizing the 
similarities and differences between the experiences of the perceiver and 
the perceived target, the insights or realizations attained are projected to 
the person who is the subject of the process, presumed to what is called by 
Reeder as perspective taking: 
 
The perceiver tries to conceptualize the target’s situation as it 
would appear to the target, seeking to appreciate the target’s 
current state of mind. This process may require that the perceiver 
 
24 Glenn D. Reeder, et.al., “Attributing Motives to Other People,” in Other Minds: How 
Human Bridge the Divide between Self and Others. (New York: The Guildford Press, 2005), 
106-123. 
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make some adjustment or accommodation to his or her own 
mental state before it is projected onto the target.25 
 
To intentionally adopt the perspective of the other person requires 
a calibration of one’s own perspective to embrace other’s perspective and 
typically this is done in an empathic interaction with others. Empathic 
interactions with others are at times manifested in such instances where a 
person seeks for a friend’s advice and comfort, or a psychotherapist adopts 
the mental world of a patient. If a friend or a patient mourns, you empathize 
with them through embracing the feeling of their lamentations, or if they 
are celebrating an accomplishment or a hard-earned success, you rejoice 
with them, or if they are experiencing angst, you feel their deep anguish. To 
empathize with them, you surrender your own feelings, your own thoughts, 
your own beliefs and you situate yourself in their very position, to 
apprehend their very experience, thus, you put yourself exactly as who they 
are. Empathy is not a simple resonance of affect between the self and the 
other, as Decety remarked, but this perspective taking creates an explicit 
representation of the other. This makes empathy as described here a 
representational capacity.26 
Simulation, representation, and empathic interaction are 
significant to experience others, so is attribution of motives. This idea is 
deliberated by Glenn Reeder and David Trafimow and asserted that: 
 
Perceivers think of motives as mental states that describe the goals 
and aims of a person’s intentional actions. By attributing such 
motives, perceivers gain some understanding of what a person 
means in conversation, how the person’s actions fit together, and 
why the behavior occurred in the first place.27 
 
 
25 Reeder, et.al., “Attributing Motives to Other People,” 114. 
26 Decety, “Perspective Taking as the Royal Avenue to Empathy,” 156. 
27 Reeder, et.al., “Attributing Motives to Other People,” 106. 
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Inferences on the motives of others requires keen observation and 
logical sense to appropriately associate the behavior of a person, which is 
overt, with the thought processes and reasons that the person has for doing 
a certain action or for responding in a certain way, which is most likely 
covert. This might be a spontaneous grasp of impressions to make sense of 
behavior but this also focuses on the mental states of a person acting not in 
a random manner. Succession of actions is operated to attain a specific 
goal, fueled with motive, and relying on these actions are good predictors 
of trait attributions, and since mental states are also manifested through 
this, therefore, motive extrapolations is a mechanism to access others’ 
phenomenological experiences. 
Another way of attributing one’s self to fathom the consciousness of 
others is through imitation, which coined by Marco Iacoboni as human 
mirror system, which in a sense is a bit technical in its approach: 
 
The human mirror neuron system and more generally neural 
mirroring mechanisms seem essential for imitative behavior, a 
cornerstone of social cognition. They also seem to play an 
important role in empathy, by making it possible to simulate what 
other people are feeling. This is probably why mirror neurons 
were selected by the evolutionary process. They allow us to 
connect deeply with other individuals. Mirror neurons solve 
gracefully the problem of other minds, which is fundamentally a 
problem of having access to the mind of other people. Mirror 
neurons seem to let us have that access in an effortless, automatic 
way.28 
 
Iacoboni focuses mainly on the systematic mechanisms of the brain, 
pertaining to ‘human mirror neuron system’ that gives us the capability to 
 
28 Marco Iacoboni, “The Human Mirror Neuron System and Its Role in Imitation and 
Empathy,” in The Primate Mind: Built to Connect with Other Minds, ed. Frans De Waal 
and Pier Francesco Ferrari (USA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 32-47. 
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get involved with others’ minds, to experience what they are experiencing, 
through mirror neurons. This ‘process’ of imitation is built-in in our 
cognitive system, since our brain is implanted with this mirror neurons, 
making our act of connecting with others and to the external world 
involuntary. Iacoboni then asserted that since this act of mirroring one’s 
self to others is automatic, our sense of empathy towards others situating 
ourselves in others’ disposition comes natural. Our mental states somewhat 
compels us to be interactive with others and puts us socially relevant 
through understanding others. 
Empathic interaction, motive, imitation, simulation, and 
representation are simply few but most relevant in attributing one’s own 
trait, states, and characteristics onto others. The means to access the 
subjective experience of others through self-projection requires knowledge 
of the self and the awareness that one’s self is distinct from others. The 
essence of understanding the mind, particularly the consciousness of 
others—their thought processes and their manifestation through behavior 
and articulations—lies on the fact that we are relevant and interconnected 
with each other. Each individual, having their own attributions and 
awareness, operates as a whole, therefore, must be involved with the other 
individuals. Moreover, since the aforementioned attributions, such as 
shared representations between the self and the other, is inculcated in our 
bodily mechanism, it is therefore inevitable for any of us to operate 
separate from the others. As Fussell stated:  
 
We also explore the role of this mutual understanding in the 
collaborative process… The performance of collaborative physical 
tasks requires substantial coordination among participants’ 
actions and talk.29 
 
 
29 Fussell, et.al., “Visual Cues as Evidence of Other’s Minds in Collaborative Physical 
Tasks,” 92. 
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One’s subjective experience and its relevance to others’ subjective 
experience exhibits this collaborative process attaining one goal—to act 
holistically with the self and the others. 
 
THE PHENOMENON OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
 
It is significant to give emphasis on the attainment of a collaborative 
process in the phenomenon of experiencing others’ consciousness through 
self-projection. As the nature of one’s consciousness to others’ 
consciousness is substantially relational, the mechanism of experiencing 
others would primarily constitute intersubjective engagement which is 
demonstrated through joint attention, manifesting co-construction of 
meaning, thus, achieving a common knowledge between the two subjects. 
Arriving on a common knowledge would require joint field of reference 
which enables linguistic communication,30 thus, there is lexical and 
rhetoric exchange to acquire objectivity of thought. 
Deploying objective truth between two subjects considerably takes 
account of articulation in which the act of utterance and interpretation is 
catalyzed. In a dialogical endeavor, in which you assume the role of a 
listener striving to comprehend the state of mind of the interlocutor, you 
do not remain passive in your goal of interpreting the speaker’s reports or 
narrative through affirming your own experiences, but you utter 
elucidations or response so as to confirm if the interlocutor’s statements 
are correctly grasped. If otherwise, the interlocutor can suggest a response 
to your initial projection and understanding, aiming a better depiction of 
the narrated idea. This occurrence posits the intersubjective engagement of 
the interlocutor and the listener, where both of the subjects are interacting 




30 Naomi Eilan, Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in 
Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: New York, 2005), 7. 
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… distinct individuals (subjectivities or subjects) can negotiate 
between them a reality that suits them. In this reality, a person’s 
own idiosyncratic experiences are reconciled with those of others 
through communication and negotiation—at least reconciled 
sufficiently enough to enable joint action. Thus, this process 
serves to create a common and shared reality that incorporates the 
distinct meanings present for each individual.31 
 
Common and shared reality between the two subjects is devised 
through the articulation of thoughts, and interpretation of its sense by 
means of imagination. Both subjects are able to view each other’s thoughts 
by its mere representations and sense, and the objective perception of it. 
The mechanism of interpreting reports and narratives, and constructing 
the meaning of the objects of focus, are a collaborative process, a joint 
endeavor, which catalyze meaning constructed mutually, that is, between 
the cognizing subjects. The arrival to a common knowledge between the 
cognizing subjects is certain as both meditate in their own thoughts while 
negotiate interpretations with each other, thus, both assuming the 
functional role of co-attenders in the periphery of each other’s experience. 
This co-operative, mutual understanding on particular reference, asserts 
joint attention and mutual interpretation that is attained through 
reciprocal interaction—thus, should not be solitary but fluid and dynamic. 
The fluid and dynamic state of interaction is made sense from the 
fact that the behavior of one person towards another is a function of how 
the first person experiences the other,32 that is, one’s mere understanding 
of the other is on the basis of how one self experiences the other through 
one’s own interpretative lens.33 As human beings basically are self-
 
31 Gordon Sammut, et al. Understanding the Self and Others: Explorations in 
Intersubjectivity and Interobjectivity (Routledge: New York, 2013), 4. 
32 Laing, Phillipson, and Lee, Interpersonal Perception, 9-10. 
33 Ibid., 131. 
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interpreting animals,34 making them profoundly interpretation-
dependent, the act of perceiving others through interaction is the act of self-
projection—in which the existence of that other person enters into the 
individuation of one’s experience.35 The relational standpoint of both 
subjects confirms their experience of each other, jointly constructing 
shared reality, both engaging, thus establishing intersubjectivity: 
 
In the essence, then, the idea of intersubjectivity postulates that, 
through social interaction, distinct individuals (subjectivities or 
subjects) can negotiate between them a reality that suits them. In 
this reality, a person’s own idiosyncratic experiences are 
reconciled with those of others through communication and 
negotiation—at least reconciled sufficiently enough to enable joint 
action. Thus, this process serves to create a common and shared 
reality that incorporates the distinct meanings present for each 
individual.36 
 
This experience of collaborative endeavor holds the two subjects, 
both being the interlocutors, to communicate and converge their two 
diverging perspectives,37 which will eventually come to a distributed 
thinking, as both takes the shared thought and reality in an objective 
manner. Indeed, intersubjectivity is a social, cognitive, and affective 
phenomenon that of which exhibits sharing of experiential content among 
a plurality of subjects.38 
 
34 Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1985), 45. 
35 Eilan, Joint Attention, 288. 
36 Sammut, et al. Understanding the Self and Others, 4. 
37 Barbara Fultner, “Intersubjectivity in the lifeworld: Meaning, cognition, and affect,” 
in Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, 
Consciousness and Language, ed. Ad Foolen et. al. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Co., 2012), 201. 
38 Jordan Zlatev, et al., “Metaphor and subjective experience: A study of motion-
emotion metaphors in English. Swedish, Bulgarian, and Thai,” in Moving Ourselves, 
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As the account of consciousness is primarily defined in its Intentionality 
and non-Intentionality, we have arrived in an idea that there must be a 
significant distinction on its usage relevant to the context—the former 
implying consciousness’ association to a certain thing either tangible or 
intangible, making one in full awareness directed towards something, and 
the latter implies a distinction between conscious and unconscious, a 
separation from awareness to non-awareness of the surroundings. This 
distinction substantiates contextualization of the term thus securing its 
appropriated meaning and sense. This is essential as consciousness, being 
aware of something, is basically in the direction of external and internal, 
which is, the environment and the introspection of a person. These 
involvements of consciousness have been extrapolated in this paper as both 
are interconnected with one another, particularly in the sense that a person 
operates within the environment and to suitably function, s/he has to relate 
to others who also operates in the same environment, through 
introspection. 
Aside from the deliberation on the awareness to maneuver one’s self 
in the environment, we have also explicated the notion of introspection in 
twofold approach: introspection to accumulate knowledge of one’s self and 
introspection to access others’ consciousness. The first approach provides 
the essence of us knowing our own thought processes, beliefs, state, 
behavioral responses—the overall subjective experience, giving us the 
capability to maneuver ourselves in accordance with the occurrences in our 
environment, as it is important to act on the basis of not just our ability, 
but on what is necessary. Moreover, self-knowledge establishes the fact that 
we are distinct from others who also have their own subjective experience. 
As remarked by Patricia and Paul Churchland mentioning the notion of 
qualia, there are profound differences in each person’s sensations, creating 
 
Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness and Language, 
ed. Ad Foolen et. al. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2012), 1. 
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a whole distinct phenomenological experience for each of us.39 What one 
senses is distinctive from what others can sense, attesting to the fact that 
we perceive and comprehend things differently, subjectively. One’s state, 
behavior, thought, belief, response, mechanism and character or 
temperament is certain to be divergent to others, thus, establishing the 
uniqueness of his/her constitution from others. 
This clear distinction between the self and the others is important 
as this signifies the possibility of the notions of representation, simulation, 
imitation, empathic interaction, and all the opportunities of self-
attribution to others. All these modes, aside from articulation of mental 
states, pave way to access other’s consciousness. As what has been 
mentioned, these modes rely on our own impression of others, and grasp 
and comprehend what we perceive from them through assessing our own 
selves, and attribute our nature and character to them. Shared 
representation of the self and the other is almost significantly parallel to 
that of simulation, as both modes require self-knowledge and self-
assessment and use these to extrapolate others’ behavior and states. We 
recollect our own experience and relate to others’ experience and deduce 
information and insights through these. We add and subtract things from 
our recollection and experience, thus calibration, to better situate ourselves 
in the disposition of others. Imitation, in this instance, could begin as we 
mirror ourselves exactly to others. Since experience is subjective, therefore 
impossible to be perfectly same, and the manner of acquisition and 
internalization of experiences are different from one person to another, 
what we can do is adjust ourselves embrace others. This could also pave 
way for empathic interaction in which the emotions and feelings of others 
are comprised in accessing the consciousness of others, not simply overt 
behavior and direct articulation of thoughts. We recollect our past feelings 
or emotions, if we happen to be in the same instance as the others before 
 
39 Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness, 52. 
C. Coles  141 
 
© 2021 Philosophical Association of the Philippines 
https://suri.pap73.org/issue14/coles_suri_october2021.pdf 
or if we happen to have an almost similar sensation or sentiment, to 
position ourselves where others are in. 
All the modes of accessing others’ consciousness discussed are 
propositions limited to subjectivity of experience, which is posed as the 
hard problem in understanding the human mind. It is more than the 
explanation of firing of neurons in the brain, how certain regions of the 
brain operates in processing sense-data and inputs of information, both of 
which are considered as the easy problem. Both differs from their 
approaches but one thing is certain—that consciousness is a fundamental 
feature of the world, and that even though we have a very limited manner 
of characterizing consciousness, that is, physical processes of the brain and 
the phenomenological experience of a person, this is what will leave us 
distinct from machines with inscribed behavior and computational 
procedures.40 But then, insights relevant to the machine consciousness and 
its parallelism and distinction to the consciousness of humans is a complete 
different discussion. 
This paper settles on the actuality that the default way of accessing 
other’s consciousness is accessing our own consciousness. Our own 
knowledge of ourselves gives us a way of looking out at the world from 
where we are, and our very own characteristics and individuality is what we 
reflect towards others, these are what we think they are. Probably that is 
the limit of our understanding of others, aside from being trusting on the 
articulation of mental states, we rely on the impression we perceive and 
subject it to our own interpretation. We cannot simply say that our 
interpretation and verification of the impression we are perceiving is 
invalid or incorrect for we weigh in things using of human reason, unless 
one is physiologically incapable of doing so. So far that we are able to reason 
and substantiate it using the impressions and observations, our 
understanding is considerable. Therefore, projecting ourselves, attributing 
 
40 Blackmore, Conversations on Consciousness, 42. 
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our very essentiality, onto others thus far provide us experience of others’ 
consciousness. 
The utmost point we can further with the claim of this paper is the 
intersubjective engagement of two cognizing subjects—the one who self-
projects and the one whose consciousness is the object of self-projection. 
This engagement displays reciprocal interactions which postulates joint 
construction of meaning, interpretation and representation. This 
collaborative endeavor between the two interactive subjects might as well 
display integrated thinking, thus, both subjects are co-constructor of co-
ordinated processes of each other’s thinking and experiences. 
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